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THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF ONE WHO
IMPROVES THE LAND OF ANOTHER
UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA
BETTERMENT STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this note concerns the rights and remedies, and
the situations under which they may arise, of one who erects
improvements on the land of another as provided by the South
Carolina Betterment Statute.1 At the outset a distinction should
be made between the class of persons who are within the protec-
tion of the statute and those who are merely trespassers. Ordi-
narily trespassers are not entitled to compensation for improve-
ments they have made on the land of another, even though the
landowner has been substantially enriched thereby, because the
trespassers have no equitable support for their claim. It would
certainly be unjust to require a landowner to reimburse such a
wrongdoer for improvements he may have made as a condition
precedent to recovering his land. However, there is a class of
persons who stand in a substantially different position with
respect to a right to compensation from the landowner whose
land has been enhanced in value by reason of the improvements
so made.2 Admittedly the improver in this case has no better
title to the land than the trespasser has, but his claim arises from
the fact that he has occupied the land with a strong and reason-
able belief in his title which is usually supported by a deed in-
valid for reasons not appearing on its face. It would be highly
inequitable in such a case to allow the owner of the fee to reac-
quire his land, which may be enhanced many times in value,
without any obligation to compensate the dispossessed occupant
at least for part of his expenditures. Therefore, in order to pro-
tect the equity of such an improver in his improvements, practi-
cally all jurisdictions including South Carolina have enacted
"occupying claimant" or "betterment" statutes.
A statutory remedy is practically the only way by which the
rights of an improving occupant may be protected, since at com-
mon law there was no remedy, and any landowner who was for-
tunate enough to have his land improved received a windfall
gain for which he was not obligated to pay. The theory was that
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401 to -410 (1962).
2. 27 Amd. JuR. Improvements § 10 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7
(1944); 10 TiomSoN, REL PRoPERTY § 5299 (1924).
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all improvements placed on the land became part of the realty
vesting title to them in the owner of the fee.3 There was also the
argument in the common-law courts that a land owner should
not have to pay for improvements or betterments which he did
not authorize and for which he may have no use.4 Needless to say,
this rule caused considerable hardship to the improving occu-
pant, who had no intent to defraud the landowner, by giving the
landowner a benefit which he did nothing to earn. The civil law,
however, rejected this view and recognized the idea that one
ought not to enrich himself at the expense of another. Under the
civil law view the good faith occupier would be entitled to com-
plete compensation for the improvements he placed on the land
less the amount claimed for loss of rents and profits by the own-
er. DEquity follows the rule of the civil law and the maxim that
"one who seeks equity must do equity," and would therefore rec-
ognize the claim of an improving occupant in those cases where
an equity court had jurisdiction. This arises when the plaintiff in
ejectment had only an equitable title to the land or when he was
asserting a claim for rent or mesne profits lost during the period
of the defendant's occupancy. However, the modified equity rule
adopted in the common-law jurisdictions placed severe limita-
tions on the improver's right to claim compensation. The claim
may only be asserted against the owner's claim for rents or
profits and then only as a set-off against the rents and profits
awarded the owner. No claim could be made by the improver
for any amount that the value of the improvements might exceed
the value of rents and profits,( and for this reason the improver
was in no better position than he was under the strict common
law rule. The right to deduct the value of improvements from the
rent did not give the improver any real advantage because the
rent collectible by the landowner was only that which the land
in its unimproved state would bring in,7 and the improvements
may have enhanced the value of the land far beyond its unim-
proved rental value. At best equity provided only a negative
gain, and at worst there was a strong possibility of heavy loss
to the improver. This was the situation that prompted the enact-
ment of betterment statutes in one form or another in practically
all jurisdictions.
3. THo Psog, REAL PROPERTY § 5295 (1924).
4. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 263 (1958); 27 Alr. J.]. Irnprovements §5 (1940).
5. 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 6 (1944).
6. 10 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 5296, 5297 (1924).
7. Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 11 (1952).
[Vol. 17
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The general purpose of all such statutes is to protect those
rights of improving occupants which equity courts had long
recognized by affording them compensation for their improve-
ments. In light of the fact that the statutes are clearly in deroga-
tion of the common-law, some courts have construed them strict-
ly. However, others have considered the fact that they are reme-
dial in nature and have interpreted them liberally so as to
effectuate their underlying social purpose.8 There is also some
variation among the different jurisdictions as to whether the
statutes are to provide the sole or exclusive remedy, or merely
to supplement equity in situations not provided for in the stat-
utes. Despite these variations from state to state, however, all
the statutes perform basically the same function: to compel the
owner of land to pay over to one who occupied the land with a
good faith belief in his title the value of the improvements there-
by erected as a condition to recovering the land.9
A. The South Carolina Statute
Prior to the enactment of the betterment statute, 0 South
Carolina followed the modified equity rule under which an
improver was allowed to set off the value of his improvements
against the claim of the landowner for rents or profits, but where
no recovery could be had for the amount by which the value of
the improvements exceeded the value of rents and profits.' The
original betterment statute was enacted in 1870 to fulfill the
need stressed previously by "softening the asperities of the law
and affording relief where none otherwise existed,' 1 2 and since
that time it has been modified to cope with different situations
as they have arisen. The South Carolina Supreme Court has
tended toward a fairly liberal construction of the statute noting
its underlying social policy. However, since the statute provides
for a new and exclusive remedy the court has limited its ap-
plication to those situations where no remedy had previously
existed.' 3 The statute has consistently been held to have no appli-
cation to partition actions among co-tenants. The co-tenant im-
8. 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 6 (1944).
9. Ibid.
10. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 57-401 to -410 (1962).
11. 'Martin v. Evans, 1 Strob. Eq. 350 (S.C. 1847) ; Dellet v. Whither, Chev.
Eq. 213 (S.C. 1839).
12. Tumbleston v. Rumph, 43 S.C. 275, 279, 21 S.E. 84, 86 (1895).
13. Howard v. Kirton, 144 S.C. 89, 142 S.E. 39 (1928); Bethea v. Allen,
101 S.C. 350, 85 S.E. 903 (1915).
1965] NoTs
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proves his own land, not that of another, and equity has long
provided a remedy to the improving co-tenant by giving him
the increased value of the property due to his improvements or
by giving him that section of the property with his improve-
ments.14 The statute is inapplicable in foreclosure suits brought
by a mortgagee, since such actions are not for the recovery of
land,15 and also in cases where the improver's occupancy has
been with the permission of the owner so as to preclude disputes
between landlords and tenants.16
The statute as it appears today provides alternative methods
of claiming compensation for betterments depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. 17 Under the method originally
provided and presently prescribed in the first section of the
statute, if the defendant in ejectment, or those under whom he
claimed, believed at the time of purchase that they were receiv-
ing a good title, the claim for compensation must be made in a
direct action brought within forty-eight hours after final judg-
ment" of the action in ejectment at which the plaintiff was
successful. 19 Under the terms of this section the defendant in
ejectment could recover the full value of all improvements made
by himself or by the one from whom he purchased the land if, at
the time of purchase, he supposed that he was receiving a good
title, and this right would not be jeopardized if at the time of
building the hnprovements the occupant had notice of a possible
defect in his title.
20
The second method of asserting a claim is provided in section
57-407. This section was introduced in 1893 and read as follows:
In any action hereafter brought, or now pending, and which
has not been heard, for the recovery of lands and tenements,
whether such action is denominated legal or equitable, the
defendant, who may have made improvements or better-
14. Hall v. Boatwright, 58 S.C. 544, 36 S.E. 1001 (1900); McGee v. Hall,
28 S.C. 562, 6 S.E. 566 (1888).
15. Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-410 (1962).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401, -407 (1962).
18. "Final judgment" has been interpreted to mean the final determination
of the issues by jury verdict in the circuit court rather than the entry of formal
judgment, Godfrey v. Fielding, 21 S.C. 313 (1884), even where the case is
subsequently appealed, Garrison v. Dougherty, 18 S.C. 486 (1883).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-401 (1962).
20. Salinas v. Aultman Co., 45 S.C. 283, 22 S.E. 889 (1895) ; Tumbleston v.
Rumph, 43 S.C. 275, 21 S.E. 84 (1895); McKnight v. Cooper, 27 S.C. 92,
2 S.E. 842 (1887) ; Templeton v. Lowry, 22 S.C. 389 (1885).
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NOTES
ments on such land believing at the time that his title there-
to was good in fee, shall be allowed to set up in his answer
a claim against his plaintiff for so much money as the land
has been increased in value in consequence of the improve-
ments so made.
21
The effect of this section was to modify and supplement section
195222 by providing a different method of asserting the claim
under a different set of facts. 23 If the defendant in ejectment
believed at the time he made the improvements that his title was
good, though not necessarily believing so at the time of purchase,
he might make his claim in his answer. 24 However, this section
would not allow the defendant in ejectment to file a claim in
his answer for the value of improvements made by the one from
whom he acquired the land even if that person thought his title
to the land was good when he made the improvements. This
interpretation was arrived at in Bethea v. Allen.25 There the
court noted that, even though a purely arbitrary distinction
between an improver and one claiming under an improver was
created, the statute was unambiguous on the point and any
change would have to be made by the legislature; but until then
a claim for improvements made by one claiming under the im-
prover would have to be made in a separate direct action as
provided in section 1952.26 Subsequently in 1917, section 1957 '7
was amended by the addition of the following:
or betterments made by any person under or through whom
he claims, if it be shown that the defendant actually believed
he was taking good title in fee simple thereto at the time
of the alleged taking thereof.28
After the addition of this clause the section appeared in sub-
stantially its present form. The effect of this amendment, which
may have been prompted by the opinion in Bethea v. Allen,29
was to permit the defendant in ejectment to claim the value of
21. § 1957 Revised Statutes (1893) (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-407 (1962)).
22. Revised Statutes (1893) (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-401 (1962)).
23. Salinas v. Aultman Co., supra note 20; Gadsden v. Desportes, 39 S.C.
131, 17 S.E. 706 (1893).
24. Tumbleston v. Rumph, supra note 20; Aultman v. Utsey, 41 S.C. 304, 19
S.E. 617 (1894) ; Gadsden v. Desportes, upra note 23.
25. 101 S.C. 350, 85 S.E. 903 (1915).
26. Revised Statutes (1870) (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-401 (1962)).
27. Revised Statutes (1870) (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-407 (1962)).
28. Civ. Code '22 § 5301 (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-407 (1962)).
29. Supra note 25.
19651
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the improvements made by the previous occupant in his answer,
if, at the time of making the improvements, the occupant
thought his title to the land was good and if, at the time of pur-
chase, the defendant in ejectment thought he was getting a good
title.30 The right to compensation for improvements under either
section 57-401 or 57-40731 requires the allegation and proof of
facts which give rise to the claim and bring it within the scope of
one section or the other.3 2
B. The Constitutionality of Betterment Statutes
The constitutionality of the betterment statutes has generally
been upheld in the United States against the claim that it im-
pairs vested rights.83 The constitutionality of the South Carolina
statute was upheld in Lumb v. Pinckney.3 4 The court first
pointed out that the policy of the statute was to remedy the
inadequacies of the existing law by protecting the equity of one
who improved another's land by mistake. They then upheld the
right of the legislature to enact such a law, because the state
constitution contained no prohibition express or implied against
it. The court rejected the contention that the statute violated the
right to hold and enjoy property by pointing out that the con-
stitution also protects equitable rights and that the property
rights of the improver in his improvements would lack protec-
tion but for the act. The court also rejected the argument that
the statute deprived the owner of his land without due process
for the reason that, if this argument was sound, it would tend to
make all the laws in effect at the time of the ratification of the
constitution final and unalterable, virtually destroying the func-
tion of the legislature. As to the contention that it was a taking
of private property without compensation, the court felt that
this would be better argued by the improving occupant. It would
be a taking of his property without just compensation if the
landowner could merely appropriate it to his own use without
any obligation to pay for it, whereas the landowner was being
deprived of none of his property. The argument that it abridged
30. Howard v. Kirton, .ipra note 13.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
32. Reaves v. Stone, 231 S.C. 628, 99 S.E.2d 729 (1957) ; Howard v. Kirton,
.rpra note 13; Tumbleston v. Rumph, supra note 20; McKnight v. Cooper,
mepra note 20.
33. 27 Am. Jun. Improvements § 6 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 6
(1944).
34. 21 S.C. 471 (1884).
[Vol. 17
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freedom of contract was dismissed as having no application to
the issue before the court.35
II. THE RIGHr TO COA NSATION
A. The Good Faith of the Improver
Since the statutory remedy is to protect the equity of an im-
prover, it follows that the maxim that "one who seeks equity
must do equity" applies to the extent that an improver's claim
must be based on an equitable right to the improvements, not-
withstanding the fact that such improvements are on land be-
longing to someone else. Therefore, before an individual may
take advantage of the rights and remedies under the betterment
statute in South Carolina, as in most other jurisdictions, he must
meet certain requirements-one of the most important being the
establishment of his good faith belief in his title, either when he
purchased the land or when he undertook to improve it. ao In
most jurisdictions this excludes all those that have knowledge of
the owner's claim to title or are mere trespassers. 3 ' However,
some jurisdictions will allow compensation for improvements
made where good faith is lacking: for example, where the owner
by his conduct may be estopped to claim lack of good faith on
the part of the improver, or where the statute distinguishes
between "necessary" and "useful" improvements, allowing com-
pensation for the former but not for the latter in the absence
of good faith occupancy.38
Some statutes attempt to define good faith, but most merely
include this as a prerequisite to recovery; and there is some va-
riation among the different jurisdictions as to what indicates
good faith. Generally, good faith is present where the improver
occupied the land and made the improvements in the honest and
reasonable belief that he had a good title thereto.3 9 One who pur-
chases land which both he and the grantor know is owned by
another is not acting in good faith; but if the one purchasing
has no knowledge of the defect, he may be acting in good faith,
in which case he may claim compensation for the improvements
35. Id. at 478-80.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401, -407 (1962).
37. 27 Am. Jura Improvements § 15 (1940); 42 CJ.S. Improvements § 7
(1944).
38. 42 CJ.S. Improvements § 7 (1944) ; 10 TiiompsoN, REAL PRoPmRTY § 5305
(1924).
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made by his grantor. The reason for this result may be explained
by the fact that, even if the grantor made the improvements, the
grantee paid for them when he paid the amount by which the
land was enhanced in value because of the improvements. There-
fore he should be allowed to recover at least this much from the
landowner who is only entitled to the land in its unimproved
state. One who had occupied the land only hoping to perfect his
title by the statute of limitations is of course not acting in good
faith anywhere.
40
Probably the widest variation among the jurisdictions is as
to the effect of notice of an adverse claim on the good faith of
the occupant. The majority view is that, where the occupant has
notice that his title is deficient, he won't be allowed compensation
for improvements begun after that time.41 However, there are a
substantial number of cases that will allow the occupant com-
pensation for improvements begun after notice of the adverse
claim when, in spite of the notice, he retains a strong and reason-
able belief in the validity of his title.42 In practically all juris-
dictions the improver will be allowed to recover the value of his
improvements begun before but completed after notice of his
defect of title, particularly where to do so would preserve their
value which might otherwise be lost.43 The notice which is neces-
sary to destroy the element of good faith is something more than
a mere rumor of a possible defect, but is actual knowledge of
some circumstance which if investigated further would reveal
the defect in the title.44 Constructive notice from records in some
jurisdictions has been held to negate good faith, but this is not
universally accepted because the occupant is not expected to
know of defects not appearing in his title.45 Notice provided
by the landowner's bringing a suit in ejectment will almost
always prevent recovery for improvements begun after that time,
but not where they are only completed after the bringing of suit
if completion would be necessary to preserve their value.46
In South Carolina as in most other jurisdictions, the equitable
right of an improver to recover the value of his improvements
40. 10 THOmPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 5305 (1924).
41. 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (b) (1944).
42. 27 Am. JUR. Improvements § 15 (1940).
43. 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (b) (1944).
44. 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (b) (1944).
45. 27 Am. Ju. Improvements §§ 16, 17 (1940) ; 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7
(b) (1944).
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depends on his good faith or bona fide belief in the validity of
his title.47 Prior to the enactment of the statute, the South Caro-
lina Equity Courts had long held that an improver would not be
entitled to a reduction in rent by reason of his improvements
where he had notice of the owner's right to the land at the time
he made them.48 In Belton v. Brigg, 49 however, the court indi-
cated that notice might not prevent recovery where the improve-
ments were clearly for the benefit of the landowner; but the
court did not permit the improver to recover because he knew
his title to the land was in dispute and because there was no
evidence that the landowner was benefited by the improvements.
This case seems to imply that one who makes improvements on
another's land knowing at the time that his title is disputed
might still be able to recover the value of improvements if they
were beneficial to the owner for the purposes to which he in-
tended to devote the land. However, the later South Carolina
cases made no distinction between beneficial and non-beneficial
improvements and only mentioned the need for good faith on
the part of the improver to enable him to make a set-off against
rents and profits.50 The betterment statute eliminated the dis-
tinction altogether so that in most cases good faith is absolutely
essential to recovery for any type of improvements.5 1 There
was also an indication that the bad faith of the improver would
not preclude his recovery where the conduct of the landowner
had been such as to induce the improver to occupy the land, 2
but this is beyond the scope of this note.
Since the enactment of the statute, the effect of notice on the
improver's claim has been considerably diminished. The improv-
er must still be a bona fide possessor of the land, 53 which pre-
sumably means that he genuinely believes that his title is good
and that he has no notice of any adverse claims, 5 4 but he need
only be a bona fide possessor at the time of purchase; or if he
wants to make his claim for betterments in his answer he must
be a bona fide possessor at least at the time he made the improve-
47. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401 to -408 (1962).
48. Belton v. Briggs, 4 Des. Eq. 465 (S.C. 1814); De Brahm v. Fenwick's
Ex'rs, 1 Des. Eq. 114 (S.C. 1785).
49. 4 Des. Eq. 465 (S.C. 1814).
50. Martin v. Evans, 1 Strob. Eq. 350 (S.C. 1847).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401 to -408 (1962).
52. Dellet v. Whitner, Chev. Eq. 213 (S.C. 1839).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-401, -407 (1962).
54. BLACK, LAW DicroNARY (4th ed. 1951).
1965] NoTs
9
Ehrhorn: The Rights and Remedies of One Who Improves the Land of Another u
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SouTE CARomNA LAW REVmW
ments. This does not mean that by merely establishing the fact
of bona fide possession at either one or the other of the two times
required in the statute the improver is automatically entitled to
compensation. The statute is designed to protect the equities of
improvers but not at the expense of the landowner, thereby
requiring a balancing of the equities of both parties. When there
are facts tending to show that it would be inequitable to the land-
owner to permit the improver to recover even though he is within
the letter of the statute, recovery will be denied because he is not
within the "spirit" of the statute. Therefore, the effect of notice
is important in South Carolina only to the extent that it affects
the relationship between the equities of the landowner and those
of the improver. 5 Where the equitable basis of the improver's
claim is not destroyed by notice of a defect in his title, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has been liberal in allowing recovery.5 6
The case of Templeton v. Lowry 7 involved a claim for the
value of betterments which were made after suit was brought
to recover the land. The facts out of which the suit arose are as
follows. Adickes foreclosed on a mortgage against Bratton there-
by acquiring the latter's land, a portion of which he conveyed to
Templeton. However, prior to the foreclosure against Bratton,
Lowry had executed a contract to purchase this land. In the pro-
ceeding to determine who had title to the land, Lowry prevailed"8
and Adickes refunded the money paid by Templeton for the
land. Templeton then brought a direct action to recover the value
of the improvements he had made after notice of Lowry's ad-
verse claim which was provided by the former suit. The prin-
ciple issue was the effect of notice on the claim. The court upheld
Templeton's right to recover basing its decision on the wording
of the statute-that the improver have a bona fide belief in his
title at the time of purchase, and that once this is established
subsequent notice does not affect his claim. 59 Apparently Tem-
pleton's equitable right to compensation was not impaired by
the fact that he had notice of the adverse claim at the time he
made the improvements, but the court didn't pursue this aspect
of the case in any detail and appeared to base its decision solely
on the ground that Templeton believed at the time of purchase
55. Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1923); Gadsden v.
Desportes, supra note 23; Johnsonv. Harrelson, 18 S.C. 604 (1883).
56. Bethea v. Allen, supra note 25; Templeton v. Lowry, supra note 20.
57. 22 S.C. 389 (1885).
58. Adickes v. Lowry, 12 S.C. 97 (1879).
59. Templeton v. Lowry, "upra note 57, at 392.
[Vol. 17
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that he was getting good title. However, the court must have
been aware of the decision in Johnson v. Harrelson6" (which
arose only six years previously and denied recovery on substan-
tially the same facts) and of the equitable nature of the remedy;
therefore Templeton v. Lowry 1 may only be considered author-
ity for the proposition that notice by itself will not prevent
recovery for improvements made thereafter. When considered
in the light of the other cases on the point,62 it is well settled
that the right to compensation is not absolute but depends on
the equity of the improver.
The foregoing is a summary of the South Carolina position
on what circumstances will not destroy the requisite element of
good faith. Based on the relatively few cases that have dealt
with this point, it may be said that South Carolina has a fairly
liberal attitude toward the rights of good faith improvers.
Since good faith is a jury question," the cases generally go no
further than to determine whether the occupant had a genuine
belief in his title,64 and most of the cases appear to revolve around
the requirement of color of title, which will be considered later.
As is true in most jurisdictions, one who procures a deed by
fraud or who knows the deed is invalid 5 is not acting in good
faith in South Carolina. However, in Rabb v. Flenniken com-
pensation for improvements was allowed where the defendant
in ejectment had knowingly purchased the land in breach of a
trust. The beneficiary of the trust had approved the sale, but
since he was incompetent to act, it was subsequently set aside.
The plaintiff claimed rents and profits and Flenniken claimed
compensation for betterments. The court allowed the claim for
betterments in spite of Flenniken's knowledge of the terms of the
trust (which gave him at least constructive knowledge that he
would not be getting a good title) apparently because he had been
advised by "eminent counsel" that his title would be good. This
case is unique in that the court has not been faced with a similar
situation since. But with the complexities of law being what they
60. Supra note 55.
61. Supra note 57.
62. Youmans v. Youmans, supra note 55; Gadsden v. Desportes, supra note
23; Johnson v. Harrelson, supra note 55.
63. Salinas v. Aultman Co., supra note 23; Gadsden v. Desportes, supra note
23; Templeton v. Lowry, supra note 57.
64. MaCauley v. Howard, 230 S.C. 140, 94 S.E2d 393 (1956); Salinas v.
Aultman Co., supra note 20.
65. Reaves v. Stone, supra note 32.
66. 32 S.C. 189, 10 S.E. 943 (1890).
1965]
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are and the tendency of laymen to rely on the advice of counsel
when purchasing land, the court might well find that one who
purchased a defective title relying on the advice of counsel was
acting in good faith and should be entitled to compensation for
his improvements even though he is not entitled to retain the
land.
B. Possession and Color of Title
In addition to the element of good faith, there is the require-
ment in most jurisdictions that the occupant be in possession of
the land 7 and that his occupancy be under color of title.68 As
to possession, it must be adverse and actual as opposed to con-
structive and permissive. Adverse possession is usually that pos-
session which would ripen into a fee after the passage of the
number of years needed to create title by prescription, but ad-
verse possession has been held in some cases to mean nothing
more than possession in ignorance of the owner's title.69 Adverse
possession in practically all states precludes occupation with the
permission of the owner since the occupant is technically not a
possessor and because he has knowledge of the owner's title.70
Actual possession has been held to mean something less than com-
plete personal occupancy, so that this requirement is satisfied
if the land is occupied by a tenant or agent acting for the im-
prover or if the improver has maintained the property and used
it for industrial or agricultural purposes.7 1 A few states have
the additional requirement that possession be for a certain period
of time before there is a right to claim improvements.
7 2
The principal provisions of the South Carolina statute are that
the occupant (1) purchase the land, (2) suppose that his title
is good in fee either at the time of purchase or when he makes
the improvements, and (3) occupy the land adversely to the
interest of the owner.78 The third requirement (inferentially) of
67. 27 Am. Jun. Improvements §§ 8, 9 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7
(c) (1944).
68. 27 Am. Jun. Improvements § 11 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (d)
(1944).
69. 27 Am. JuR. Improvements § 9 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (c)
(1944).
70. 27 Am. JuR. Improvements § 9 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (c)
(1944).
71. 27 AM. Jun. Improvements § 8 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (c)
(1944).
72. 27 Am. Jun. Improvements §§ 8, 9 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7
(1944).
73. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 57-410 (1962).
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adverse possession by the improver is the closest the statute comes
mentioning possession at all. If the improver was in possession
of the land with the permission of the owner, he will be pre-
cluded from asserting any claim for betterments
...unless it shall appear on the trial of the action, that
such owner has neglected to fulfill such contract of his part,
in which case such person in possession shall be entitled to
all the privileges in this chapter provided for those who
entered upon land under supposed title and the same pro-
ceedings shall be had and the land shall be held in the same
manner as herein provided for.
74
The court, however, has not been strict in applying this require-
ment probably because it is not specifically stated in the statute.
If the term "adverse possession" had been used, the court might
have defined it in terms of that possession which would even-
tually ripen into a fee, but instead the statute merely provides
that the occupancy may not be permissive so that the "adverse
possession" required by the court may mean, as in some jurisdic-
tions,75 possession in ignorance of the owner's title. In Shute v.
Shute,76 the defendant in ejectment was permitted to recover the
value of the improvements he made in spite of the fact that there
was evidence tending to show that he had occupied the land with
the permission of the owner (his father) and that there was no
breach of contract which would bring the case within the excep-
tion in section 57-410. 77 The requirement of actual possession
which is necessary in some jurisdictions is completely disre-
garded by the statute and none of the reported cases mention it.
The reason for this may be found in the fact that under the
South Carolina statute an occupant of land need not have been
in possession of the land when the improvements were made-
the provision which allows him to recover the value of improve-
ments made by the one from whom he acquired the land78 is
fairly unique and is not found in many other jurisdictions.
Color of title is the second major prerequisite to recovery
which must be met by a good faith improver. As will be seen
later, color of title is closely related to good faith to the extent
74. Ibid.
75. 27 Am. JuIp. Improvements § 9 (1940) ; 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (c)
(1944).
76. 82 S.C. 264, 64 S.E. 145 (1909).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
78. Salinas v. Aultman Co., 45 S.C. 283, 22 S.E. 889 (1895).
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that it will not be present when the deed or instrument purport-
ing to convey title is procured by fraud. Color of title is the
appearance of title but is imperfect in some way not readily
apparent to the one asserting it. In most jurisdictions there can
be no color of title where the occupant is not holding under some
deed or other written instrument of title, whether or not it is in
his possession, so that color of title is missing where the occupant
is in possession of the land under an oral promise to convey.
7 9
The early South Carolina decisions did not mention color of
title specifically, but referred only to the improver's good faith
belief in his title. However, in the few cases that allowed the
improver to set off the value of his improvements against the
owner's claim for rent, he had occupied the land under circum-
stances that resembled the modern concept of color of title. This
is best illustrated in Martin v. Evans0 where the improver occu-
pied the land under a deed acquired at a sheriff's sale which was
subsequently found to be invalid. The betterment statute contains
no specific requirement of color of title except inferentially from
the supposition of the occupant that he is getting a good title.
In view of the fact that color of title is related to good faith and
because the statute is designed to "work out the equities of a good
faith improver,1181 the cases have generally held that there has
to be some reasonable claim to title which will set the improver
apart from the ordinary trespasser,82 and the court has appeared
to follow the majority view with regard to color of title. In
Salinas v. Aultman,83 a controversy arising out of the prior
action of Aultman v. Utsey,84 the plaintiff claimed the value of
betterments made by the defendant in ejectment, Utsey. The facts
out of which the first action arose were that Utsey had acquired
the land in question after a series of mesne conveyances from
one Pope, the original owner of the land, and a debtor of Ault-
man. Utsey mortgaged the land to Salinas who subsequently
foreclosed the mortgage and received a master's deed of convey-
ance at the sale. In the first action Aultman succeeded in having
the conveyances which subsequently vested title in Utsey set
aside as a fraud on the creditors of Pope. This also invalidated
79. Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 404 (1958); 27 Am. Jup. Improvements §§ 10-12
(1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 7 (1944).
80. Supra note 50.
81. Tumbleston v. Rumph, 43 S.C. 275, 21 S.E. 84 (1895).
82. Cayce Land Co. v. Guignard, 135 S.C. 446, 134 S.E. 1 (1926).
83. 45 S.C. 283, 22 S.E. 889 (1895).
84. 41 S.C. 304, 19 S.E. 617 (1894).
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the master's deed of conveyance, but nevertheless, the deed was
sufficient to establish color of title and on that basis Salinas was
able to recover the value of Utsey's improvements.
Recovery was denied an improver in Cayce Land Co. v.
Guignard"5 since the basis of his claim to title was an oral prom-
ise to convey under which no deed ever passed. For this reason
the court held the defendant to have no greater right or claim
to compensation than any other trespasser. In National Surety
Co. v. Carstens,"0 the defendant acquired his title to the land he
improved through a partition among the other cotenants, all of
whom were heirs of his father's estate. The court held that there
was ample evidence to prove that at the time of the partition the
defendant did not know of the plaintiff's paramount claim
against the estate to which the land was subject; therefore, his
occupation and improvement of the land was made in the good
faith belief that his deed was valid. Since both the elements of
good faith and color of title were present, the defendant was
held entitled to the value of his improvements.
A claim for compensation was denied in Smith v. Hanna8 7
with the court holding that there was no color of title where the
improver was merely on the land under an expectancy of an
inheritance. The land had been devised to Mary Nesmith in terms
which appeared to give her only a life estate with remainder to
her children, in this case Anna Hanna, one of the co-defendants.
Mary Nesmith conveyed the land to the plaintiff who brought
this action in ejectment to dispossess the defendants. The de-
fendants claimed the deed to the plaintiff was invalid and count-
erclaimed for improvements. The court interpreted the devise
to Mary Nesmith to give her a fee conditional which had ripened
into a fee absolute enabling her to convey the land to the plain-
tiff. The defendant's possession of the land was clearly supported
by no color or claim of title which would maintain an action
under the betterment statute, and they certainly could not have
been said to be in ignorance of Mary Nesmith's exclusive right
to the land even if her interest was only for the duration of her
life.
Compensation for improvements was allowed in McCauley 'V.
Howard8 where the defendant in ejectment held the land under
85. Supra note 82.
86. 159 S.C. 222, 156 S.E. 336 (1930).
87. 215 S.C. 520, 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949).
88. 230 S.C. 140, 94 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
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a deed which was invalid because of a lack of title in the grantor,
a fact of which the defendant was not aware. In Reaves v.
Stone,80 the claim for improvements was denied despite the fact
that the defendant in ejectment held the land under a tax deed,
because he knew that the deed was void on its face. The land
occupied by the defendant was part of the estate of the defend-
ant's deceased brother which had passed to the decedent's wife
and children. The defendant acquired the land when it was
attached and sold for non-payment of delinquent taxes. The in-
validity of the deed came from the fact that it named the dece-
dent as grantor instead of the plaintiffs to whom title to the land
had passed. This and other facts about which the defendant was
well aware gave him at best a questionable title which was insuf-
ficient to enable him to claim compensation for improvements.
In Dunham v. Davis,90 another case involving a tax deed which
was invalid because the land was conveyed by the decedent's
estate on which there had been no administration, the claim for
the value of improvements was upheld. However, in this case
the improver had no knowledge of the invalidity of the tax deed.
These two cases provide a good example of the relationship be-
tween color of title and good faith. Both claimants were in
possession of the land under an invalid tax deed, but where the
claimant had knowledge of its invalidity, his claim was denied.
From the foregoing it may be concluded that South Carolina
follows the majority view as to what constitutes color of title and
requires that the claimant occupy the land under a deed or other
written instrument purporting to convey title. The reason for
this becomes apparent when consideration is given to the equit-
able nature of the betterment statute as pointed out in Tumble-
ston v. Rumph.91 It would not be equitable to the landowner to
require him to pay for improvements he did not authorize where
the one making them had no right or claim to the land, no matter
how slight, which would create an equitable right to his im-
provements. For this reason the improver's possession of the
land must be based on something in writing which would appear
valid to one acting in good faith. However, the deed does not
necessarily have to be in the possession of the one occupying the
land. In Shute v. Shute,92 the defendant in ejectment held the
89. 231 S.C. 628, 99 S.E.2d 729 (1957).
90. 232 S.C. 175, 101 S.E.2d 278 (1957).
91. 43 S.C. 275, 21 S.E. 84 (1895).
92. 82 S.C. 264, 64 S.E. 145 (1909).
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land under a deed which he claimed his father had conveyed
to him as a gift. The deed was valid and would have conveyed
a good title to the land except for the fact that it was not deliv-
ered. Nevertheless, the defendant was entitled to the value of
his improvements under the betterment statute.
C. Vhat are Improvements?
While good faith and color of title may be the two most im-
portant prerequisites to recovering the value of improvements,
there is yet a third which concerns the nature of the betterments
for which compensation may be had. The improvements for
which a defendant in ejectment may be compensated are usually
those which add to or enhance the value of the land and which
are of a permanent and beneficial nature.93 This distinguishes
them from repairs or improvements of a temporary nature. The
characteristic feature of improvements is that they are perma-
nent accessions to the freehold that may not be removed because
of the resulting damage to the realty, which excludes trade fix-
tures from this category. Buildings such as houses, barns, ga-
rages and miscellaneous farm buildings are the most usual form
of improvements; but improvements may also include preparing
the land for subdivision, laying roads and sidewalks, planting
orchards and erecting fences. 94 The list is virtually endless.
While repairs are usually not compensable as improvements,
numerous cases have allowed recovery for them. However, these
repairs are usually of such a substantial and beneficial nature
in themselves that there may be little difference between them
and improvements, such as the complete renovation of a house.
Some courts tend to disregard the nature of the repair but use
the discretion they have in equity proceedings to decide the ex-
tent to which compensation will be allowed for repairs.95
Prior to the enactment of the betterment statute in South
Carolina, there were no cases that even considered the issue of
the type of improvements for which one could claim compen-
sation. Occasionally, the court would mention what improve-
ments, the defendant in ejectment made, such as buildings 0 or
clearing timberlands,97 without commenting farther. This prob-
93. 27 Am. JuR. Improvements § 19 (1940); 42 CJ.S. Improvements § 1
(1944).
94. Annot, 24 A.L.R2d 11 (1952).
95. Annot., 24 A.L.R2d 11 (1952).
96. Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324 (S.C. 1845).
97. Belton v. Briggs, supra note 48.
19651 NoTs
17
Ehrhorn: The Rights and Remedies of One Who Improves the Land of Another u
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SoUTH CAnOLInA LAW REVmW
lem was not solved by the enactment of the statute since it con-
tains no definition of improvements, and until fairly recently the
issue had not appeared before the South Carolina Supreme
Court. The early cases decided under the act were no more illum-
inating than those decided before the statute. The court seldom
went further than to point out that the improvements repre-
sented a valuable expenditure by the defendant in ejectment
which enhanced the value of the realty,98 or to mention the
improvements for which the defendant was claiming compen-
sation.00
In Reaves v. Stone,100 however, the court itemized the list of
improvements which the defendant claimed and had been
awarded by the master. It should be remembered that the de-
fendant was held not entitled to any compensation because of
his lack of good faith in occupying the land. When the case was
appealed by the defendant, the plaintiff made no motion to
reverse the award of compensation for the improvements made
by the defendant, giving as a reason that, even if they were suc-
cessful in having the award reversed, they would not gain any-
thing because they would not be able to collect the amount they
were entitled to as rent from the defendant. The amount awarded
the plaintiffs for rent more than cancelled out the compensation
for improvements awarded the defendant. Therefore, the court
did not reverse the award of compensation to the defendant but
refused to allow the appeal for additional compensation. The
improvements for which compensation was approved consisted
of clearing the land, installing flues in the house, roofing the
house, putting in a floor and ceiling, installing brick piers under
the house, installing plumbing and paying the taxes on the land
as well as the interest on the taxes. There was no discussion by
the court of the nature of improvements as opposed to repairs,
even though some of the improvements, particularly the work
done on the house, might be considered to be repairs. Thus, this
case doesn't provide a very useful guideline on the question.
Less than a year later the issue was squarely before the court
in the case of Dunham v. Davis1 0 ' which is now the leading case
on the point. The defendant in ejectment succeeded in recovering
a judgment for betterments in the amount of $18,000. The im-
98. National Surety Co. v. Carstens, supra note 86.
99. Salinas v. Aultman Co., mipra note 83.
100. Supra note 89.
101. Supra note 90.
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provements consisted of a sum that was to "'adjust the equities"
of the parties and compensate the defendant for his maintenance
of some timbered land, preparation of the land for tillage, a soil
building program, clearing approximately sixty acres of land,
building a packhouse and shed and tearing down and moving an
old house. The court cited with approval the majority definition
of improvements' 0 2 in upholding the claim for compensation for
all the improvements except the maintenance of the wood lot
because they represented a permanent benefit which enhanced
the value of the realty. No compensation was allowed for the
general maintenance of the wood lot, even though its value had
increased four times, because there was no expenditure of time
or money except for general maintenance. The increase in value
apparently came from the natural growth of the trees rather
than from anything the claimant had done. The court pointed
out that there might have been compensation if the claimant
had undertaken to fertilize the trees, build fences or thin out
scrub timber as it then would have been possible to attribute part
of the increase in value to the claimant's efforts. Preparing the
land for cultivation was also held not to be a compensible im-
provement. Unlike the soil building program which constitutes a
long range benefit to the land, simply preparing the soil for
cultivation adds no lasting benefit to the land. The effect of this
case is to conclusively adopt for South Carolina the majority
view as to what improvements are compensible. However, in view
of the fact that this is the only case that has been heard on
appeal on this point, it is highly probable that the established
majority definition of improvements has long been applied in
the lower courts of this state so that Dunham v. Davis' ° does
not overrule any settled principles of law.
III. Tnm ComnmNSAoNO To Br AWARDED
Once the determination is made that the defendant in eject-
ment is entitled to compensation for improvements, there re-
mains the problem of deciding how much compensation will be
awarded. Generally, the measure of compensation is the value by
which the improvements enhance the realty, and this may be
determined from the difference in the market value of the land
in its improved and unimproved state. In applying the general
102. 27 Aic JuLm Improvements § 19 (1940); 42 C.J.S. Improvements § 1
(1940); Annot, 24 A.L.R2d 11 (1952).
103. Dunham v. Davis, supra note 90, at 184, 101 S.E.2d at 282.
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rule of measuring the value imparted to the land by reason of
the improvements, the courts consider such factors as the con-
dition of the improvements when the land is repossessed, the
location of the improvements on the land and their cost to the
improver either at the time they were made or their value at the
time of repossession. Also, as a general rule, the cost of the im-
provements will not be the measure of compensation although
it may be a factor to be considered in arriving at a determination
of the enhancement in value of the land.10 4
A. Valuation of Improvements
The law concerning the valuation of improvements has long
been settled in South Carolina and is thoroughly in accord with
the majority of jurisdictions. The early equity decisions which
dealt with improvements before the betterment statute was
enacted allowed only the value of the improvements up to the
amount of rents and profits recoverable by the owner of the
land.105 In all cases the value recoverable by the improver was
held to be the amount by which the land was enhanced by reason
of the improvements as reflected at the time of sale. 106 The early
equity rule limiting the amount of recovery awarded to the im-
prover to a set-off against rents and profits was specifically
changed by the enactment of the betterment statute to allow the
defendant in ejectment to "recover of such plaintiff in such
action the full value of all improvements made upon the land
by such defendant or those under whom he claims .... ,110 This
changed the law in two important respects. First, it allowed
compensation up to the full value of the improvements, which
was a radical departure from the old rule at chancery, and sec-
ond, it removed the requirement that the one claiming compen-
sation for improvements must himself have made them. How-
ever, the statute made no change in the method of valuation but
merely codified the old rule:
The sum which such land shall be found at the time of such
judgment to be worth more, in consequence of improvements
so made, than it would have been had no such improvements
104. Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 11 (1952).
105. Martin v. Evans, 1 Strob. Eq. 350 (S.C. 1847); Dellet v. Whitner,
Chev. Eq. 213 (S.C. 1839).
106. Martin v. Evans, supra note 105; Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324
(S.C. 1845) ; Dellet v. Whitner, supra note 105.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-401 (1962).
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or betterments been made shall be deemed to be the value of
such improvements or betterments. 08
B. The Statutory Provisions for Compensation
When the defendant in ejectment brings his action to recover
the value of his improvements under section 57-401, that is, in a
separate action within forty-eight hours after final judgment in
favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment action, he must allege the
amount of the increase in value of the land due to all the im-
provements put thereon as specified in section 57-402; and these
allegations in the complaint constitute notice to the plaintiff in
ejectment to appear and defend against them. If the plaintiff
in such action successfully proves his right to recover, he will
receive a special jury verdict on the value of his betterments as
of the date the land was recovered from him with interest from
the date of judgment 10 9 The land recovered will be held subject
to a lien in his favor which will have priority over all other
liens,110 and in the event that the judgment for improvements
is not satisfied within sixty days the land may be sold, and the
plaintiff will be allowed the amount in excess of the unimproved
value of the land up to the amount specified in the special jury
verdict."'
When the claim for betterments is made in the defendant in
ejectment's answer as provided for in section 57-407, the same
rule of valuation applies with the procedural difference that the
same jury will be utilized to find two verdicts-one for the plain-
tiff to recover his land and the other for the defendant in the
amount of his improvements.11 2 As may be seen from a close
reading of the statute the defendant in ejectment appears almost
to have paramount rights to the owner of the land, particularly
when it is remembered that the occupant's right to recover
against the owner for his improvements does not depend on any
misconduct which would raise an estoppel against the owner. 13
It should also be remembered that at common law no right to
recover the value of betterments placed on another's land existed
at all, since early jurists could see no reason why a land owner
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-402 (1962).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-404 (1962).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-405 (1962).
111. Ibid.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-408 (1962).
113. 27 Am. Jur. Improvements § 14 (1940).
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should be required to pay for improvements which he did noth-
ing to authorize.
114
The case of Howard v. Kirton1 15 provides a thorough analysis
of the betterment statute with regard to the improver's right to
recover. The issue before the court was an alleged conflict be-
tween the provisions of section 57-402116 which, in a direct action
to recover the value of his improvements, gives the plaintiff
their full value, and section 57-405117 which creates a lien supe-
rior to all other liens in favor of the plaintiff for the collection
of his judgment, and the direction in section 57-40611s that if
the land is sold the proceeds would be first paid over to the
plaintiff in ejectment up to the unimproved value of his land
as found by the jury after which the excess, if any, would be paid
to the defendant up to the amount awarded by the jury for his
improvements. This conflict, it was argued, should be resolved
in favor of the plaintiff-improver by interpreting section 57-406
as merely directory in the light of sections 57-402 and 57-405.
At the trial, the jury found in a special verdict that the im-
proved value of the land was $3750, the value when purchased
by the plaintiff-improver was $2500, and the total amount
therefore due the plaintiff was $1250. The defendant then elected
to sell the land to pay off the claim and the plaintiff waived
the sixty day period. The proceeds from the sale were insuf-
ficient to satisfy both the claim for the improvements and the
claim for the unimproved value of the land. In considering the
basic question presented by the appeal concerning the conflict
between the right of the improver to the full value of all the
improvements and the prior right of the land owner to be first
paid the unimproved value of the land out of the proceeds of the
sale, the court decided in favor of the landowner. The occupying
claimant does have a right to the full value of all the improve-
ments, and he does have a lien in preference to all other liens
but not in preference to the prior right of the landowner to his
land which, because of his ownership of the land, is not in the
nature of a lien. Therefore, if the land is sold to pay the special
verdict, the plaintiff in ejectment has the right to be completely
compensated up to the unimproved value of the land before the
114. 10 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 5295 (1924).
115. 144 S.C. 89, 142 S.E. 39 (1928).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
117. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
118. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
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defendant-improver may receive the value of his improvements
from the excess.
On the basis of this opinion it is apparent that -where the de-
fendant in ejectment receives a money judgment of a consid-
erable amount for his improvements, the plaintiff may simply
not pay. He may suffer his land to be sold and collect its full
unimproved value allowing the defendant to be compensated
from whatever may be left. This may not be very much if the
improvements are of a unique nature such as railroad equipment
for which there might not be a ready market. While such a
result may not appear to be very equitable to the improver, there
is something to be said for the way that it protects the land-
owner's equity since otherwise he might be left with unique im-
provements that have no use to him. However, the court in the
Howard case could see no particular reason for the method pro-
vided by the statute which determines the respective shares of
the contesting parties merely by allowing one to take preference
over the other. They observed that a more equitable solution
would ensue if the jury were to find a verdict based on the pro-
portional value of the improvements to the land. Then, regard-
less of the amount of proceeds from the sale, each party would
receive a proportional amount.
The plaintiff had also claimed an exception on the basis that
the verdict was not in the proper form; that is, that the jury
had not determined the unimproved value of the land but had
based their finding on the purchase price of the land as paid by
the plaintiff. This error becomes significant when it is remem-
bered that the occupying improver is entitled to the full value
of all the improvements placed on the land, either by himself or
by the one under whom he claims,119 and that in this case the
purchase price represented the value of improvements placed
on the land by the prior occupant. However, the court disposed
of this ground of appeal by holding that any mistake in the ver-
dict or in the charge to the jury should have been raised at the
trial.
Justice Cothran dissented, arguing that, when all the sections
of the statute are read together, they definitely give the plaintiff
a superior claim to everyone including the landowner. National
Surety Co. v. Carstens120 may have vindicated Justice Cothran.
There the court gave the defendant in ejectment a lien superior
119. S.C. CoDE Axx. §§ 57-401, -407 (1962).
120. 159 S.C. 222, 156 S.E. 336 (1930).
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to the plaintiff's up to the amount to which he was entitled for
his improvements when the land was sold. However, this case
should not be understood as overruling Howard v. Kirton 21
because of substantially different circumstances under which the
plaintiff in ejectment claimed title to the land. In the Howard
case the plaintiff in ejectment was attempting to recover land
that he rightfully owned, but in National Surety Co. the plain-
tiff was merely attempting to have the land sold in payment of
a debt. The order of the court decreeing the sale then gave him
a lien on the land which under the terms of the betterment
statute would be subordinated to the lien of the improver. One
further advantage of the improver's lien that is worth noting is
that homestead property, which normally can't be reached by
creditors, is subject to it under the authority of the South Caro-
lina Constitution.
1 2 2
The value of betterments which the improver is entitled to
recover is well settled in both the statute123 and the cases124 to
be the enhancement in value of the land because of the improve-
ments and not the cost of the improvements themselves. How-
ever, the cost of the improvements may still be considered and, in
the absence of other evidence, may be the amount actually
awarded. In Dunham v. Davis,125 the defendant in ejectment was
awarded the following amounts for improvements at the trial;
$1271.17 for the construction of a packhouse and shed, $234 for
tearing down and moving an old house, $5476.35 for clearing
about sixty acres of land and $1904.83 for a soil building pro-
gram.120 The value awarded at the trial was based on the cost
of the improvements rather than on the value which they im-
parted to the land. The evidence put forth by the landowner only
disputed the cost of the improvements and did not attempt to
show that the actual increase in value of the land was less than
the cost of the improvements; however, there was some evidence
indicating that the cost of clearing the land was greater than
the resulting increase in value. For this reason all the amounts
awarded by the master except those for clearing the land were
121. Supra note 115.
122. S.C. CoNsT. art. 3, § 28 (1962); Wilson v. Counts, 52 S.C. 218, 29
S.E. 649 (1898).
123. S.C. CoDE ANN. §57-402 (1962).
124. Howard v. Kirton, supra note 115; Harmon v. Harmon, 54 S.C. 100, 31
S.E. 881 (1898).
125. Supra note 90.
126. There were other amounts awarded for items that were held on appeal
not to be improvements and therefore won't be considered here.
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affirmed. This case doesn't change any principles of law, but it
does stand for the proposition that in the absence of any other
evidence the cost of the improvements may be the amount actual-
ly awarded.
0. Compensation to be awarded the Landowner
It has long been the rule that a landowner who has been de-
prived of the use of his land is entitled upon the recovery of it
to the payment of those rents and profits which he could get by
bringing his claim in an equity court. In fact it was this right
which originally gave rise to the equitable claim of the occupant
to be compensated for his improvements. 1'2 7 However, there have
been cases where the claim for rents and profits has been denied,
such as where the owner has by his conduct mislead the occupant
into occupying the land, or where the land has no rental value
apart from the improvements. 28 The period for which rents and
profits may be claimed usually extends only to the period of
actual possession of the occupying claimant and not to the period
of the one under whom he claims unless the improver may make
a claim for the improvements made by his predecessor. Usually
the rent and profits charged are on the unimproved value of the
land, except in cases where the improvements were made in bad
faith or the improvements were needed to prepare the land for
its use. Some jurisdictions by statute provide for the rent to
include the value added by the improvements particularly in
those cases where the improver's recovery is determined by his
expenditures, where he is allowed interest on the amount spent,
or where he is allowed to recover the value of his improvements
beyond the amount of rents and profits.' 29
South Carolina has long followed the view that the right to
land implies a right to the profits accruing therefrom,1 0 but
until the betterment statute was enacted it was not clear whether
the rent would be on the land in its improved or unimproved
state. Section 57-409 reads as follows:
The plaintiff in an action for the recovery of lands and
tenements shall recover nothing for the mesne profits of the
127. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 263 (1958).
128. 42 CJ.S. Improvements § 12 (1944).
129. Annot, 24 A.L.R.2d 11 (1952).
130. Martin v. Evans, 4upra note 105.
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land, except on such improvements as are made by him or
those under whom he claims. 181
The section has been interpreted to give the plaintiff in eject-
ment only the rent which the land would bring in its unimproved
state, 18 2 and where the land has no rental value apart from the




There have not been many cases decided under the betterment
statute in South Carolina, but among those that have, three
trends may be observed. First, the decisions seem to adopt a lib-
eral interpretation of the statute despite the fact that it is in
derogation of the common law. There are numerous indications
from the cases that this is because of its remedial nature. 34 Sec-
ond, the courts have recognized its equitable nature and have
used their discretion to insure that only those whose conduct has
the support of equity will be entitled to recover. 136 Third, where
the case law has been sparse on a particular point the court has
tended to follow the rule adopted by the majority of jurisdic-
tions.'30 Of these three trends, the equitable nature of the remedy
and its application by the court is the most important and must
be kept in mind by one seeking to invoke the aid of the better-
ment statute. In short, one who seeks equity must do equity.
ROBERT M. ERORN, JR.
131. S.C. CODE Am. § 57-409 (1962).
132. Reaves v. Stone, 231 S.C. 628, 99 S.E.2d 729 (1957).
133. Jacobs v. Bush, 17 S.C. 594 (1882).
134. Howard v. Kirton, supra note 115; Tumbleston v. Rumph, sipra note 91.
135. Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1923); Gadsden v.
Desportes, 39 S.C. 131, 17 S.E. 706 (1893); Johnson v. Harrelson, 18 S.C.
604 (1883).
136. Dunham v. Davis, supra note 90.
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